Discussions
All Categories
Groups
Help
Twitter
LinkedIn
Facebook
YouTube
Instagram
Trustpilot
Child Item
Home
Welcome to the Bitdefender Expert Community
Windows
Protection - Malware/ Firmware/etc.
[Bug]: Behavioural blocking marks a development folder as "Internet zone", denies writes to other folders, and blocks ShellExecute
EQC
Hello Bitdefender Team,
241-attachment-probe-output-2026-11-18.txt
Environment
Product: Bitdefender Antivirus Free for Windows. Product version shown in the app
: Bitdefender Antivirus Free | Build 27.0.65.370 - Engine binary bdservicehost.exe reports
FileVersion 30.0.33.176. Auto-update is enabled; product package update (~286 MB) was
installed on 2026-11-16 15:37 local time; Advanced Threat Defense signature set updated
2026-11-18 14:23.
OS: Windows 11 24H2 (build 26100, UBR 4770). No Windows update installed since 2026-05-08.
Windows Defender is off (Bitdefender registered). Smart App Control is off
(VerifiedAndReputablePolicyState = 0). Single user, runs as administrator.
The affected folder: H:\App-Projects\FaceNest (a portable application tree on a fixed
HDD volume; ~67,000 files). It contains a launcher FaceNest.exe (1,733,562 bytes,
unsigned) and a bundled Python 3.11 runtime at App\python\python.exe which loads
.NET Framework assemblies through pythonnet/clr_loader and creates WinForms windows.
The same application, unpacked on another volume (D:\FaceNest-Temp\FaceNest-win64),
works perfectly. Byte-identical interpreter on both locations:
App\python\python.exe, 91,648 bytes,
SHA256 5040847FA3E3CC8F0224DBD4F629C8658672E9EEB282D3F4D2C82DAAB61EC494.
What happens (four symptoms, all measured on 2026-11-18)
S1 — Application fails to start, exit code 1:
clr_loader\netfx.py raises "RuntimeError: Failed to resolve Python.Runtime.Loader.Initialize
from ... pythonnet\runtime\Python.Runtime.dll". The underlying .NET Framework load
failure is HRESULT 0x80131515 — "attempt to load an assembly from a network location".
In the same folder, the Microsoft-signed netstandard.dll loads fine; the unsigned
Python.Runtime.dll (445,952 bytes, netstandard2.0, NotSigned) is refused.
Workaround we applied: App\python\python.exe.config with
<loadFromRemoteSources enabled="true"/>. After that the app starts, so the assembly
itself is not corrupt.
S2 — Processes whose image lives under that folder cannot write anywhere outside it:
os.mkdir / file creation returns PermissionError [WinError 5] "Access is denied" for
R:..., C:\Users<user>\Pictures, \Videos, \Documents, C:\Users\Public, D:, E:\ and
H:\ (volume root), while writing inside the folder succeeds. A byte-identical copy of
the same interpreter run from D:... writes to all of those locations successfully, and an
unrelated interpreter (D:\MiniConda3\python.exe) succeeds everywhere. The target
folders' NTFS ACLs are standard (Administrators/SYSTEM Full Control, Authenticated Users
Modify, no deny entries) and PowerShell can create the very same folders.
S3 — ShellExecute from that folder is denied: os.startfile(<folder inside the tree>)
returns PermissionError [WinError 5], while subprocess.Popen(["explorer.exe", <same
folder>]) succeeds from the very same process. So plain process creation works, the
"open in Explorer" API path does not.
S4 — Windows shows an "Open File - Security Warning / the publisher cannot be verified"
dialog for H:\App-Projects\FaceNest\FaceNest.exe (Get-AuthenticodeSignature = NotSigned).
Related measurement: the .NET security zone of everything under
H:\App-Projects\FaceNest** is evaluated as "Internet", while H:\ (root),
H:\App-Projects, freshly created folders on H:, and D:, C:, E:\ all evaluate as
"MyComputer" (measured with System.Security.Zone.CreateFromUrl along the ancestor chain).
No file in the tree has a Zone.Identifier stream (0 of 67,174 files), so this is not the
classic "unblock downloaded file" case.
Extra entries on the folder's access control list (present on the child, absent on the
parent and on the working copy on D:)
D:(CI;DT;;;WD) — deny DELETE_CHILD for Everyone
A:(OICI;0x110156;;;S-1-4-759796880-586660735) — grant to a composite integrity label SID
icacls also renders Mandatory Label\Low Mandatory Level:(OI)(CI)(NW) on this folder.
Of the 6 folders inside H:\App-Projects, only FaceNest carries these entries.
We tried to remove them: an ACL built from the folder's own SDDL minus exactly those two
ACEs (verified 8 remaining ACEs, Administrators/SYSTEM/Authenticated Users intact)
was passed to Set-Acl, and icacls "H:\App-Projects\FaceNest" /remove:d "Everyone" was
tried. Both calls block indefinitely in the kernel (>30 s) and have to be killed; the
security descriptor is left untouched. We read that as anti-tamper protection.
Timeline
2026-11-14 19:49 last successful start (backend ready in 4.9 s / 5.0 s / 6.1 s)
2026-11-16 15:37 Bitdefender product package update (~286 MB) installed
2026-11-16 16:24 mtime of H:\App-Projects\FaceNest
2026-11-18 14:23 ATC signature update
2026-11-18 15:24 first failures, exit code 1 (three attempts, identical)
2026-11-18 16:08 successful start after the .config workaround, backend ready in 61.2 s
No Windows component update in this window: mscoree.dll 2025-08-09,
windows.storage.dll 2025-08-10, url.dll 2024-04-01, newest WinSxS 2026-05-10.
What we already tried on the Bitdefender side — all inert, verified by re-running the
same write matrix after each change
a) Antivirus scan exclusion for h:\app-projects\facenest\ (present in
settings\system\excludemgr.xml with ExcludeFlag="39" since 2026-10-10) — no effect.
b) Advanced Threat Defense exception for h:\app-projects\facenest\ (added 2026-11-18 19:18,
visible in settings\IAtcAl.json, file_paths list = 25 entries) — no effect.
c) Advanced Threat Defense switched off entirely (settings\IAtcAl.json atc_enabled=false,
2026-11-18 20:11) — no effect; "fltmc filters" shows the minifilter still attached.
d) Bitdefender Shield switched off (settings\LGKC\vshield.xml, <profile>disabled</profile>,
2026-11-18 21:33) — no effect. All Bitdefender filters remain attached to every volume:
AscFileFilter 389995, vlflt 320832, BdDci4 320811.1, Gemma 320782, atc 320781,
Trufos 320770 (fltmc instances: C:, D:, E:, H:, R:, S:, G: and the underlying disks).
e) Re-running: after (a)–(d) the write matrix result is unchanged (8 denied / 1 allowed),
the zone verdict for the folder is still "Internet", and os.startfile is still denied.
Ruled out (with evidence, so the report can be triaged quickly)
Not a corrupt file: identical SHA256 interpreter works everywhere outside this folder.
Not NTFS permissions: target ACLs are standard; PowerShell creates the same folders.
Not quarantine: Bitdefender quarantine contains 0 items.
Not Zone.Identifier / "unblock": 0 files carry the stream.
Not Windows update: component timestamps above, last hotfix 2026-05-08 (KB5082420).
Not EFS/encryption (no encrypted files in the tree), not Smart App Control (state 0).
Not the application: the packaged build on D: (same binaries) is unaffected.
What we are asking for
Identify which protection component and which rule produces (i) the "Internet" security
zone verdict for a whole folder subtree, (ii) the write sandbox that permits writes
inside the folder and denies writes to user profile folders and other volumes for
processes started inside that folder, and (iii) the denial of ShellExecute
(os.startfile) and of security-descriptor writes (Set-Acl / icacls blocking).
Confirm whether this is a false positive of a behavioural/anti-ransomware rule
(we note the similarity to the case in Expert Community thread 107073, resolved by
Malware Research removing the detection in a subsequent update).
Provide a supported remedy that keeps protection enabled — e.g. a documented,
effective way to mark a development folder as trusted for behavioural protection.
The current Antivirus exclusion and Advanced Threat Defense exception demonstrably do
not change this behaviour, and the ATC exception UI only accepts per-file entries.
We explicitly do NOT want to run with protection switched off.
Evidence available on request
launcher log excerpts (timestamps above), the .NET load failure text and HRESULT.
The write-matrix probe output (same interpreter, two locations, target-by-target).
Zone.CreateFromUrl output along the ancestor chain.
Get-Acl SDDL of the folder, its parent, and the working copy on D:.
fltmc filters / fltmc instances output before and after each Bitdefender setting change.
Thank you!
Find more posts tagged with
Comments
There are no comments yet
Quick Links
All Categories
Recent Posts
Activity
Best Of